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Abstract: Achieving information security in the cloud is not a trivial exercise. When the systems involved are accounting
software systems, this becomes much more challenging in the cloud, due both to the systems architecture in
use, the challenges of proper configuration, and to the multiplicity of attacks that can be made against such
systems. A particular issue for accounting systems concerns maintaining a proper audit trail in order that
an adequate level of audit may be carried out on the accounting records contained in the system. In this
paper we discuss the implications of the traditional approach to such systems and propose a complementary
soft security solution relying on detecting behavioural anomalies by evidence theory. The contribution is in
conceptualising the anomalies and providing a somewhat theoretical solution for a difficult and challenging
problem. The proposed solution is applicable within any domain consisting of rigorous processes and risk of
tampering or data exfiltration, such as the cloud based accounting systems.
1 INTRODUCTION
In previous work [Duncan and Whittington, 2016b],
Duncan and Whittington highlighted a number of
issues with defining and maintaining a proper au-
dit trail. This problematic issue is particularly im-
portant for the audit of accounting software systems
which run on the cloud. Maintaining proper account-
ing records is a fundamental part of the process of
preparing statutory accounts for business enterprises.
Where the audit trail is compromised, assurance that
the records contained in the accounting system are ac-
curate is reduced, or at worst lost. Punitive penal-
ties [Sox, 2002][Law, 1996][Crown, 1998] are levied
for failure to properly maintain such records, or en-
sure proper privacy protection of data held, thus it
is vital to ensure effective steps are taken to ensure
the security and privacy of all such data processed by
enterprises. Next year, when the EU General Data
Protection Regulation comes into force, enterprises
must additionally, in the event of a data breach, be
able to identify all records accessed, compromised, or
deleted within a period of 72 hours. Failure to do so
can result in a fine of up to 4% of global turnover.
This is why we have chosen to investigate this impor-
tant issue.
The systems architecture deployed by enterprises
has seen little fundamental change over the past
decades, with the possible exception of cloud com-
puting. Many of the attacks against such systems are
continuing to be successfully deployed against enter-
prises. The approach on this problem is often by us-
ing technical means alone frequently being expressed
as policies authorising some action. But the busi-
ness architecture of an enterprise comprises people,
process and technology [PWC, 2012], not technology
alone, thus such solutions are generally doomed to
failure, as suggested by [Duncan et al., 2013][Dun-
can and Whittington, 2014][Duncan and Whittington,
2015d][Duncan and Whittington, 2015b], who note
such approaches ignore the impact of people and pro-
cess on security.
Since the evolution of the cloud paradigm, there
has been some reluctance on the part of enterprises to
adopt the technology. Much of this resistance stems
from a lack of trust in the cloud service providers’
(CSP)’s ability to maintain good levels of security
and privacy [Armbrust et al., 2010]. In the light of
ever increasing globalization, concern over difficul-
ties in meeting cross border data protection regula-
tions [Kuner, 2010], also has an impact on take-up
of cloud. Concern, too, has been expressed [Walden,
2011], over issues involved in trying to obtain ac-
cess to records held in foreign jurisdictions. Concern
has also been expressed about the difficulties of cloud
audit [Duncan and Whittington, 2015c][Duncan and
Whittington, 2016a], and in particular the mechanics
of maintaining a proper audit trail [Duncan and Whit-
tington, 2016b].
We therefore propose a novel complementary
means to address the issue of agent specific be-
havioural anomaly (in literature sometimes called out-
lier) detection in the context of audit in a cloud based
system. According to Chandola et al. “anomaly
detection refers to the problem of finding patterns
in data that do not conform to expected behaviour”
[Chandola et al., 2009]. The challenges are quite
well understood, with a major one regarding cate-
gorising the “normal region” and deciding whether
or not an anomaly is of malicious character. With
respect to related work, we are unaware of such on
devising algorithms for detecting behavioural anoma-
lies in cloud based audit systems; with Doelitzscher
et al. [Doelitzscher et al., 2011] noting this as fu-
ture work. In later work, the same authors applied
neural networks to learn a behavioural model of the
user [Doelitzscher et al., 2013]. This is a valid ap-
proach whenever the environment is consistent, but in
an ever changing environment, more adaptive means
are called for. Much as we might like an enterprise’s
environment to be completely consistent, the realities
of life are that this is unlikely ever to be the case,
hence the need to consider an adaptive approach. Re-
alistically, in accounting systems such a change may
be due to a judicial or a personnel change.
In this paper considering evolving cloud-based
systems, the anomaly detection mode is unsupervised,
making the assumption that the events of normal be-
haviour are far more frequent than those of anoma-
lous character. Hence, the contribution of this pa-
per is twofold: First we introduce a discussion on
the necessity of complementary security measures to
policy-based ones. This is characterised especially
in cloud-based systems where a customer may not
be aware/responsible of/for all vulnerabilities. Re-
alistic ones include personnel changes or migration
on the CSP’s part. Secondly we propose a theoret-
ical method addressing the findings of the first con-
tribution. This method is mathematically sound and
complementary (proved in related work) and provides
means for prompt reaction in case of anomalous be-
haviour. Realistically, the reaction may be a further
approval by a higher ranking officer.
The outline of the paper is as follows: In Sec-
tion 2, we will first look at the major vulnerabilities
identified by companies who carry out software se-
curity breach survey reports, and in Section 3, we
will consider the typical accounting software archi-
tecture for an enterprise, and in Section 4, we con-
sider the motivation for this research. In Section 5,
we consider how we might approach resolving these
issues, in Section 6, we outline formally our experi-
ence based theory, in Section 7 we illustrate how our
approach might work, in Section 8. we discuss the
possible impact this might have on security and pri-
vacy, and in Section 9, we draw our conclusions and
discuss future work.
2 MAJOR ENTERPRISE BREACH
VULNERABILITIES
A quick look at the annual security breach re-
ports issued by many security companies [Verizon,
2014][PWC, 2014][Trustwave, 2013] clearly demon-
strate the security and privacy problems still faced to-
day, including the fact that the same attacks continue
to be successful year on year, as demonstrated by the
five year summary of the Verizon reports shown in ta-
ble 1 below.
Table 1: Verizon Top 5 Security Breaches — 2011-2014
(1=Highest)
[Verizon, 2011][Verizon et al., 2012][Verizon, ][Verizon,
2014]
Threat 2011 2012 2013 2014
Hacking 1 1 1 1
Malware 2 2 2 2
Misuse by comp. 4 5 5 5
employees
Physical theft or 3 4 3 4
unauth. access
Social Engine. 5 3 4 3
This raises an obvious question, why is it that the
same attacks are successful year on year? And the
obvious answer has to be that these vulnerabilities
continue to work, year after year after year. Thus we
should now study the details of a typical systems ar-
chitecture for an enterprise accounting system.
3 The Typical Systems Architecture
of an Accounting System
Traditionally, bookkeeping has been done carefully
only by trained professionals and subject to rigor-
ous processes. The reason is simple, the bookkeep-
ing contains the true state of a business. Today,
bookkeeping is done with accounting software gen-
erating momentary reports on the state of the busi-
ness supporting the executives in their decision mak-
ing. However, accounting software systems have long
ceased to be just that — accounting software systems.
Since the evolution of Business Process Management
(BPM) and Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), es-
pecially since being enabled by continuing advances
in the development of technology, enterprises have
moved away from using a traditional accounting soft-
ware system to a more comprehensive Enterprise Re-
source Planning (ERP) model. This model comprises
an additional range of enterprise management pack-
ages, such as Finance Management (FM), Purchas-
ing/Procurement Management (PPM), Customer Re-
lationship Management (CRM), Supply Chain Man-
agement (SCM), Business Intelligence (BI), Human
Resources (HR), Distribution/Warehousing Manage-
ment(DWM), Inventory Control Management (ICM),
Project Management (PM),and Service Management
(SM) giving the executives a realistic forecast.
Where once this would have been provided by a
proprietary closed system, virtually all modern ERP
systems now use the client/server paradigm. If these
are hosted in-house, the business remains in control of
the access (physical and logical) to the data but need
to invest in hardware. An example of this would be
having the hardware in a room to which only some
people have access and storing the backups in a safe
with an accounting software requiring a remote desk-
top login accepting logins only within the LAN. The
bottleneck in such solutions will soon become the In-
ternet bandwidth especially as getting ever more ac-
curate and longer reaching forecasts, the amount of
internal and external data is increasing and more so-
phisticated algorithms are run on this data. For this
and because many enterprises operate globally, an ob-
vious solution was to move to a web based architec-
ture running a back end database with hardware pro-
vided on-demand, i.e. in the cloud. An obvious place
to start, then, is to look at vulnerabilities found in
web services. These provide the main point of con-
tact for adversaries trying to breach the enterprise’s
systems. For this, we turn to the Open Web Appli-
cation Security Project (OWASP) Top Ten Vulnera-
bilities list. OWASP is an international organisation
which engages in the conception, development, ac-
quisition, operation, and maintenance of applications
that can be trusted. Every three years, they produce a
Top Ten list of the most dangerous vulnerabilities.
Many of these vulnerabilities involve weaknesses
in databases and their configuration and maintenance,
and it is fair to suggest that all of the top ten vulnera-
bilities in table 2 have the potential to impact on ERP
systems. While there are a great many defences that
can be deployed to address the OWASP vulnerabil-
TABLE 2. OWASP TOP TEN WEB VULNERABILITIES
— 2013 - 2007 [OWASP, 2013]
2013 2010 2007 Threat
1 1 2 Injection Attacks
2 3 7 Broken Authentication
and Session Management
3 2 1 Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
4 4 4 Insecure Direct Object
References
5 6 - Security Misconfiguration
6 - - Sensitive Data Exposure
7 - - Missing Function Level
Access Control
8 5 5 Cross Site Request
Forgery (CSRF)
9 - - Using Components with
Known Vulnerabilities
10 - - Unvalidated Redirects
and Forwards
ities, it is clear from the effect of the Verizon secu-
rity breach reports shown in table 1 that solving the
OWASP vulnerabilities alone will not fully solve the
problem.
For example, social engineering attacks come in
many forms. Typically one thinks of devastating
phishing attacks, but also less obvious ones like re-
vealing software versions etc., may prove to be of
a critical nature. Blind hacking can be very effec-
tive when being perpetrated by a skilled actor, but
when fuelled by information obtained through social
engineering attacks, the results can be lethal. Thus,
though social engineering attacks present (only) the
third highest successful attack on enterprises, they are
likely to be a great enabler for hacking.
4 The Motivation for This Research
No matter what technological assistance or rigorous
processes are complied with, this may not be enough
to thwart a new form of attack. Often, the more care-
fully safeguarded data, the more attractive a social
engineering attack gets. Examples include Stuxnet,
the data published by Wikileaks and, though not cat-
egorised as an attack, the case of the Snowden rev-
elations. Common to all are that very, very care-
fully guarded systems / information were compro-
mised. Accounting systems are different in the way
that data need not necessarily be exfiltrated, or a sys-
tem interfered with, but mere inconsistency will prove
costly both in labour to restore them, and in the conse-
quences of possible wrong forecasts giving rise to bad
decisions. Hence, mere data inconsistency could cre-
ate havoc. Many enterprises are keen to achieve com-
pliance with standards bodies, such as the Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization (ISO). How-
ever, the pace of evolution of new technology far out-
strips the capability of international standards organ-
isations to keep up with the changes [Willingmyre,
1997], a point well illustrated by the fact that it took 8
years for the ISO to even mention cloud in their stan-
dards. With cloud standards only now starting to filter
through, it is clear that it will still be some time before
a comprehensive cloud security standard will emerge.
It is also clear that some enterprises might also suffer
from the rapidity of technology change through being
unable to keep up with such rapid change. A good
point to consider with the ISO is that many global
enterprises are keen to achieve compliance with ISO
standards, and further, the shift from the compliance
based approach to a risk based approach is very wel-
come.
Conventional technical solutions can help address
the OWASP vulnerabilities, all of which in some way
might impact on our enterprise ERP solution. What
these technical solutions cannot do, however, is to
tackle the major security breach issues as outlined
in the Verizon breach list covered in table 1. As
we stated earlier, the business architecture of an en-
terprise comprises a combination of people, process
and technology. While technological solutions might
be well advanced, and processes might be well doc-
umented, the weakest link is generally people. But
even technology and processes can fall short as a
consequence of the rapidity of change, as discussed
above, meaning that documented technology changes
might very well not be up to date. The processes of
an enterprise basically document the internal informa-
tion flow of all internal processes, and as stated, may
not be fully up to date. The third component, peo-
ple, should at least be very well documented by the
HR department. Guidance from management comes
in the form of Policies and Procedures. First, through
the development of a policy manual for the enter-
prise, where management express the general policies
which convey the thinking of management to guide
line management. This will, of necessity, be written
at a high level of abstraction. Second, procedure man-
uals will necessarily be written in some good level
of detail, so that those responsible for carrying out
process tasks understand in more depth what their re-
sponsibilities are. It is rare to find an enterprise where
absolutely every element of technology, process, poli-
cies and procedures are all fully documented and up
to date.
While people might be very well documented by
HR, it is less likely that their training will be fully
up to date. Often, a new employee is started and put
to work right away, before training procedures can
be fully implemented, thus putting the enterprise at
an immediate disadvantage. Also, some people are
not very switched on, and can be susceptible to social
engineering attacks. Sadly, the security of enterprise
will only ever be as good as the weakest person em-
ployed by the enterprise. No matter how up to date
the documentation within an enterprise is, this may
not be enough to thwart a new form of attack. Thus,
it is essential that an enterprise keep their finger on
the pulse with regard to evolving attacks, and take
steps to mitigate these at the earliest opportunity. It
is clearly of vital importance that an enterprise pay
particular attention to change management, in order
to ensure all documentation can be maintained prop-
erly and kept up to date. Likewise, any change in any
element, should be checked through all the others to
ensure there is no knock on effect which has not been
considered.
Therefore, a change in technology should prompt
a review of the policies and procedures manuals, to
see if there is any impact there, and a review of pro-
cesses carried out to ensure the existing process doc-
umentation is still fit for purpose. There should also
be a check on the people of the enterprise, in order
to understand whether this technology change will re-
quire more, or fewer, people to be involved in the pro-
cessing tasks. This is not a one way check. Every
change must be checked through to ensure no conse-
quential impact on the other aspects of the business
architecture. Given the propensity for systems archi-
tecture to be moving towards the client/server model,
the database systems in use merit special mention,
and this is especially important for cloud based sys-
tems. For the database, ensuring that a proper audit
trail is maintained is vital. Often, cloud instances are
spooled up on demand, and shut down when demand
falls. If special attention has not been paid to the col-
lection of audit trail data, which is often collected on
the running instance, once it is shut down, the data
collected dies with it, which means that other arrange-
ments must be made to ensure the data is properly
collected and stored. If the data is gone, then even the
best forensic scientist will not be able to help. When
data collected is part of the financial system of the en-
terprise, then it is especially important to safeguard
both the data and the audit trail.
For the audit trail there are some key issues that
should be considered:
1) logs must not be stored on the same host that gen-
erates them;
2) they should be append-only;
3) their originator must be identifiable. Moreover,
the;
4) log’s integrity must be protected, and;
5) the log is subject to confidentiality protection.
As this trail may not improve on the security level
provided by technology and processes as such, it pro-
vides an insight to the past usage of the database.
This highlights some serious challenges. Often
the database is hosted on the same machine as the
rest of the systems. Proper security controls are rarely
properly specified, meaning many unauthorised users
can have access to logs. And should a malicious
user gain access to the system, and be able to esca-
late privileges, then there would be nothing to stop
them from modifying logs, or deleting them alto-
gether. Another concern springs from the people em-
ployed by the enterprise. If they use the systems im-
properly through misunderstanding, laziness, lack of
training, or through malicious intent, then this could
give rise to a serious issue. Indeed, where an inside
user works in collusion with an external malicious
agent, this presents one of the greatest dangers to an
enterprise. Yet another concern surrounds the attitude
of management. Duncan and Whittington [Duncan
and Whittington, 2015a] have warned of the dangers
present when management fail to take security seri-
ously. Where this is the case, we do recognise that
this is sometimes slow to change. In total, the tra-
ditional technology providing policy-based means to
improve security yearns for complementary means to
follow up on the agent’s behaviour. This paper intro-
duces a novel means that looks at the overall business
architecture of the enterprise by detecting behavioural
anomalies. The method would utilise the audit trail to
(learn) construct a behavioural normality for an agent.
In case this normality is broken (anomaly is recog-
nised), the actions are domain specific. Realistically
this could suggest a secondary approval by a manager.
We now turn to address how detecting anomalous be-
haviour might be effected.
5 Detecting Anomalous Behaviour
Related work on anomaly detection by tracking be-
havioural patterns for soft security include that of De-
vice Comfort [Marsh et al., 2011]. Device Comfort
has been developed to detect a mobile device’s level
of comfort on its user. It considers a situational com-
fort level to be the device ownership combined with
the context (location, task, etc.) where anomalies are
actions causing the situational comfort level to drop
under some given threshold level. Later research has
targeted the mobile device to “know” its user’s diur-
nal patterns in order to detect anomaly behavioural
patterns [Bicakci et al., 2014]. This is used to detect,
for example, anomalies in the location and use of the
mobile device indicating a possible theft, giving rise
to further action based on an “anomaly score” that re-
mains undefined.
Characterising for accounting systems means
however that their operational purpose remains un-
changed and all activity is exclusive and exhaustive.
A significant change in an agent’s functional access
to the system is thereby a sign of anomaly. In cases
when the agent’s work duties have changed, this can
however be the “new normal” requiring the system to
adapt. In this paper we do present a method respond-
ing to these challenges. We do effectively the same
as with Device Comfort but for an audit system with
a focus on detecting temporal behavioural anomalies
instead of analysing the spatial context in which they
occur. The reason is obvious, as the spatial context
is the cloud, lacking any conventional spatial context.
For this we use experience based theory on exclusive
and exhaustive events to create a window of normal
behaviour in all a system’s interactions (dimensions).
We apply a factor of ageing providing the essentials
for adaption. Mathematically similar approaches have
been used for finding a level of belief and certainty on
aggregated information [Neovius, 2015]. In the next
Section, we describe how the experience based theory
might be developed.
6 The Experience Based Theory
Consider an experience defined as a four tuple
(δ,εi,ζ,η) inspired by Teacy et al. [Teacy et al.,
2006], and Krukow’s [Krukow, 2006] general model
augmented by a score. Here δ represent the agents,
ε the datum indexed by i (typically time), ζ the tasks
(events) and η the score of this experience. The his-
tory of such experiences is a set (δ,εi,ζ,η).
The observing entity, in the context of this paper,
is always the audit system. For the sake of readability,
let the exclusive and exhaustive tasks on the audit trail
ζ = (n, r, e) where n = ‘new entry’, r = ‘read’, and e
= ‘edit an old entry’. Three exclusive and exhaustive
outcomes are spanned by an equilateral triangle; with
each additional outcome increasing one dimension on
the plane. Thus, with four outcomes, the faces span
a tetrahedron. Moreover, consider atomic behaviour,
where an agent conducts at most 1 task at any given
time.
Adding a new experience to the history is straight
forward: (δ,ε0,ζ,η) ∪ {(δ,εi,ζ,η)} where 0 ≤ i.
Thus, the experience based behavioural view may be
retroactively constructed from the audit trail. On the
history, a projection provides a situational view on
some spanned plane, i.e. exp(usr1,ε j, x,η) = (ε j,η).
This projection provides all x ⊆ ζ entries of agent(s)
usr1 within the timespan denoted by j. In addition,
aggregation of dimensions to a binomial view is easy
as for the exclusiveness of the tasks by letting x denote
a non-empty set of dimensions with x¯ = ζ\ x. More-
over, assume for the sake of this example the score
η indicating the task’s level of severity. Also assume
that the initiating agent is unique and known and that
it takes full responsibility for the task.
Having a history of experiences, any agents’ (one
or a group of agents) temporal behaviour can be ex-
amined over any time span or cycle as defined by the
domain expert. For this, a decay constant 0≤ λ≤ 1 is
implemented where the closer the constant is to 1, the
less the decay. For an hourly or daily behaviour, tem-
porally older experiences reasonably weigh less than
recent, hence at εm the decay d is dεm(exp(δ,ε j,ζ,η))
= {(δ,ε j,ζ,λεm−ε j∗η)}.
With the decay providing the current trend and the
inverse, an anomalous behaviour is defined with a set
of rules on thresholds within the domain of discourse.
Optimally these thresholds are defined by a function
on the experiences in an event over a period of time
with respect to a comparable period. For example,
consider X to be a time window right now, and Y to be
all events over a comparable period in the past, and let
α( Y ) = ∑
j∈Y
dεX (exp(δ,ε j,n,η)) providing a score in-
dicating the new entries during that frame. To give an
example, a Boolean anomaly behaviour with thresh-
olds 0.8 ≤ x≤ 1.15 is then identified if the predicate
0.8*α (Y ) ≤ ∑
j∈X
dεx(exp(δ,ε j,n,η)) ≤ 1.15*α (Y )
does not hold, i.e. if the momentary situation X devi-
ates too heavily from the reference period Y (yester-
day, last week...). If this is the case, further domain
specific actions may be required, or an alert raised,
e.g. approval of an agent with more rights. Obviously,
an ensemble of complementary reference periods can
be defined and included in the predicate as the domain
specialist wishes.
7 Illustrating the Approach
This section will illustrate the approach described in
Section 6. The example used above included three
exclusive and exhaustive tasks where anomalous be-
haviour is indicated by the level of “out of the or-
dinary”. For illustration, we need an n-dimensional
barycentric co-ordinate system where n is the cardi-
nality of ζ, here 3 and thus a tetrahedron. For presen-
tation purposes, we coarsen the 3-dimensional space
to 2-dimensions, let X = x, x¯ and x = n, x¯ = r,e. This
gives us a 2 dimensional barycentric space, i.e., a tri-
angle (one face of the tetrahedron), and a way of il-
lustrating, including the transformation formulae (be-
low), originally brought forward by Jøsang [Jøsang,
1997]. Consider the base vertices to denote the bino-
mial events x⊆ ζ and x¯ = ζ.
Moreover, let ∑
j∈X
dεm(exp(δ,ε j,ζ,η)) = (1,3.6,0.06)
for respective ζ = (n,r,e) and for the comparable pe-
riod 0.9,3.2,0.01. Let the normalisation of these val-
ues include a constant W for “do not know” with a
given value 2 where higher values require more ex-
periences for certainty. Then the values for each x is
∑ x/(∑ x+∑ x¯+W ). The vectors on a proposition
are defined:−→
b (x) = ∑
xi⊆x
−→
b (xi) and
−→
b (x¯) = ∑
xi⊆x¯
−→
b (xi).
In the two-dimensional space, these two vectors
span the behaviour right now, and are vector-valued
functions on the ζ with range [0, 1]n. They are sub-
additive, as of the W, as illustrated in Figure 1 below.
The parameter ax is the base-rate parameter indicat-
ing the expected development.
FIGURE 1. SITUATIONAL BEHAVIOUR
The comparable periods centroid is calculated
similarly using the cyclic delay. The tolerance how-
ever spans an oval around this centroid, in this case
0.8 and 1.15 indicating the “normal” acceptable be-
havioural space of the agent. This is illustrated in Fig-
ure 2 below. Of note is that every time a window spans
an area of its own, where decisions on framing rules
of how many of these may be broken without being
tagged as anomalous behaviour, must be taken by the
domain expert. In a perfect world of consistent be-
haviour the time windows would span the same area.
FIGURE 2. COMPARABLE TIME WINDOW’S TOLERANCE
AND SITUATIONAL BEHAVIOUR WITHIN THIS
The interpretation of the method is such, that the
reference period defines a point on which a level of
tolerance is put. If the current window deviates from
the reference period, the behaviour is anomalous. In
Figure 2, the oval spans the reference window with
tolerance and the dot the current behaviour. If the
dot slides outside the oval, the current behaviour is
anomalous with respect to its reference period. In the
next Section, we discuss various points which will re-
quire clarification in the use of this system.
8 Discussion
There are a number of points that need to be clari-
fied in the use of our proposed system. Every new
user will be highlighted on first access to the system,
since there will be no historic data to compare against
current activities. This should trigger a need for a re-
sponsible person to investigate whether this activity
comes from a properly authorised user. If necessary, a
time or event count delay could be placed on process-
ing of their input until their actions are duly autho-
rised. An alternative would be to set up a set of default
expected behaviour whenever a new employee starts
with the enterprise. Thus any entries resulting from
a malicious user would instantly stand out as suspect.
Strict limits on the level of access granted to new users
should be in force until an established pattern of be-
haviour is developed. For this, other types of machine
learning approaches could be used. However, as we
considered a system already running, this is not the
prime focus of this paper.
Moreover, situations of anomalous behaviour that
are not of a malicious nature may be caused by a
change of duties of a user within the enterprise. At
the very least, such behaviour should be flagged up,
validated and approved. As we have already stated,
reliance on the system alone would be foolhardy.
Rather, the system should be able to create useful
alerts to highlight anomalous behaviour as it happens,
so that it might be investigated before it becomes a
major issue. In effect, we are proposing a highly ef-
ficient “management by exception approach”, rather
than either getting bogged down by too much man-
ual checking, or worse, by doing nothing at all. The
same method could be implemented as a service by
network providers to users. In the final Section, we
discuss our conclusions and consider future work
9 Conclusions and Future Work
Achieving information security in the cloud calls for
new means of addressing security. Porting the tradi-
tional approach developed for static client-server or
mainframe system to the cloud is not possible. Prob-
lems relate to the very foundations of SaaS and the
cloud paradigm, including elasticity, spatial indepen-
dence etc. Moreover, as the fundamental operations
such as accounting systems of enterprises are run on
such foundations, the stakes are high. This sensitive
information attracts fraud and calls for means to de-
tect such attacks as soon as they happen. For this,
we have in this paper proposed an algorithm detect-
ing anomalies in the usage of the system. Stakehold-
ers on this include the enterprise as well as the SaaS
provider. This provides ‘soft’ security measures and
complements policy based security actions, such as
encryption, redundancy and many more.
The trend of IT systems today is that they become
ever more cloud based, whether this be IaaS, SaaS or
‘serverless computing’. For the enterprise to move the
operationally critical software to a place maintained
by hard core professionals is appealing. When sys-
tems are run by hard core professionals, they are bet-
ter updated and less prone to cyber physical attacks.
Thus, the trend has been, and is likely to continue, that
fraudsters will utilise social attacks. To countermea-
sure such social attacks, soft security measures such
as is proposed in this paper can address these issues.
As future work, we intend to validate this method on
a real-life benchmarking dataset.
The anomaly detection method could be run by the
enterprise or by the CSP. We chose accounting sys-
tems as the application because of the readily avail-
able audit trail and the characteristic of having to be
adaptive to changes in agent.
This is the first step to a successful spoofing at-
tack, where an intruder acts as a legitimate provider
acting as the man-in-the-middle.
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